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ABSTRACT: In recent years, the irruption of blockchain technology has enhanced the impact of smart 
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the applicable law from a business-to-business perspective leaving aside the particular problems raised by 
the conflict-of-law rules oriented to protect the weaker party to a contract. The analysis, however, starts 




RESUMEN: En los últimos años, la irrupción de la tecnología blockchain ha incrementado la proyección de 
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El análisis, sin embargo, empieza con una aproximación general a los dos conceptos objeto de este 
artículo: los smart contracts y la tecnología blockchain. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
When anyone is using a vending machine in order to acquire a given product, let’s say, a 
bottle of water, that person is entering into a smart contract, in its most traditional 
meaning. Indeed, the costumer acquires the selected product by the mere action of 
introducing coins into the vending machine. This example illustrates the automated 
execution of the selling obligation as a result of the occurrence of the condition of paying 
the price by the buyer. Nick Szabo, the legal scholar and cryptographer that coined the 
above-mentioned expression of smart contracts for the first time in 19941, used this 
concrete example two years later2 to illustrate how an automated contractual obligation 
works.  
 
Now, in the 21st century, the irruption of distributed digital ledgers3 has enhanced smart 
contracts’ functionalities to such an extent that major industries such as insurance, health, 
energy, finance and telecommunications, among others, are utilizing blockchain-based 
smart contracts to either transact4 or develop projects aimed at implementing such a 
technology.5  To introduce just one example, blockchain-based smart contracts can enable 
one party to deploy a smart contract on a given blockchain which, in exchange for a 
cryptoasset, performs algorithmic investment.6  
 
Beyond the technological and computational analysis, legal research on blockchain-based 
smart contracts has also been conducted in recent years, although most of it has focused 
mainly on the compatibility of smart contracts with Contract Law, while little attention 
has been paid to smart contracts and Conflict of Laws.7 The still-emerging concept of 
 
1 SZABO, N., “Smart Contracts”, 1994, available at: 
https://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool200
6/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html. 
2 SZABO, N., “Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets”, 1996, available at: 
https://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool200
6/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html. 
3 Satoshi Nakamoto, an alias for a person or people behind it, invented the first decentralized public digital 
ledger for transacting with Bitcoin, a virtual currency; NAKAMOTO, S., “Bitcoin: Peer-to-Peer Electronic 
Cash System”, October 2008, available at: https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
4 For instance, see SMART CONTRACTS ALLIANCE and DELOITTE, “Smart Contracts: 12 Use Cases 
for Business & Beyond”, 2016, p. 9, available at: https://digitalchamber.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Smart-Contracts-12-Use-Cases-for-Business-and-Beyond_Chamber-of-Digital-
Commerce.pdf; EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Blockchain for supply chains and international trade. 
Report on key features, impacts and policy options, May 2020, available at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/641544/EPRS_STU(2020)641544_EN.pdf. 
5 CBINSIGHTS, “Banking is Only the Beginning: 58 Big Industries Blockchain Could Transform”, April 
2, 2020, available at: https://www.cbinsights.com/research/industries-disrupted-blockchain/; ORTEGA 
GIMÉNEZ, A., “Smart Contracts” y Derecho internacional privado, Pamplona, 2019, pp. 37-42. 
6 UK JURISDICTION TASKFORCE, “Legal statement on cryptoassets and smart contracts”, November 
2009, pp. 33-34, available at: https://technation.io/about-us/lawtech-panel/. Besides, on this type of smart 
contract, see also TJONG TJIN TAI, T., “Implementing Excuses”, in DIMATTEO, L. A., CANNARSA, 
M. and PONCIBÒ, C. (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Smart Contracts, Blockchain Technology and 
Digital Platforms, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020, pp. 82-83 (pp. 80-101). 
7 On Smart contracts and conflict of laws, see RÜHL, G., “The Law Applicable to Smart Contracts, or 
Much Ado About Nothing”, Blog post, https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2019/01/law-
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smart contract may be one of the main reasons for this situation, not to mention the fact 
that if this concept is tied to blockchain technology, this, in turn, may adopt different 
connotations.  
 
This paper is, therefore, situated within this context. It seeks to display the main problems 
encountered by blockchain-based smart contracts in the process of ascertaining their 
applicable law in accordance with the general connecting factors laid down in Articles 3 
and 4 of the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I)8 (hereinafter, 
Rome I Regulation). Therefore, the current paper does not address the other specific 
conflict-of-law rules set out in the same Regulation such as, for example, rules on 
consumer, employee, insurance or transport contracts. Likewise, non-contractual aspects 
raised by smart contracts, such as damages that they may be caused to third parties for 
inaccurate data storage9 or the fraud or theft that developers and/or the nodes involved in 
the blockchain may commit against the users of such network in the absence of a 
contractual relationship10, or when the smart contract satisfies a payment to the wrong 
recipient11, are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
All things considered; this research starts with a brief explanation of the meaning of the 
concept of blockchain-based smart contracts (paragraph II). After this opening 
explanation, the second part deals with the law applicable to these contracts starting with 
the distinction between the material and formal validity of blockchain-based smart 
contracts and then goes on to explore some of the most relevant problems that the general 
connecting factors embedded in Articles 3 and 4 of the Rome I Regulation may give rise 
to when applied to smart contracts (paragraph III). Finally, this paper concludes with 
some final remarks (paragraph IV). 
 
 
applicable-smart-contracts-or-much-ado-about-nothing, consulted 24/02/2020; RÜHL, G., “Smart (legal) 
contracts, or: Which (contract) law for Smart contracts?”, in CAPPIELLO, B. and CARULLO, G. (eds.), 
Blockchain, Law and Governance, Springer, 2021, and available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3552004; GUILLAUME, F., “Aspects of private international law related 
to blockchain transactions”, in KRAUS, D., OBRIST, T. and HARI, O. (eds.), Blockchains, Smart 
Contracts, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations and the Law, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham/Northampton, 2019, pp. 49-82; GUILLAUME, F., “Blockchain: le pont du droit international 
privé entre l’espace numérique et l’espace physique”, in PRETELLI,  I. (ed.), Le droit international privé 
dans le labyrinthe des plateformes digitales, Schulthesse Éditions Romandes, Genève/Bâle/Zurich, 2018, 
pp. 163-189; ZIMMERMANN, A. S., “Blockchain Networks and Private International Law”, Blog post 
accessible at https://conflictoflaws.net/2018/blockchain-networks-and-european-private-internationale-
law/; INTERNATIONAL SWAP AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, Private International Law 
Aspects of Smart Derivatives Contracts Utilizing Distributed Ledger Technology, 13 January 2020, 
available at: https://www.isda.org/2020/01/13/private-international-law-aspects-of-smart-derivatives-
contracts-utilizing-distributed-ledger-technology/. 
8 Regulation 593/2008 [2008], OJ L177/6. 
9 ZETZSCHE, D., BUCKLEY, R. P. and ARNER, D. W., “The Distributed Liability of Distributed 
Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain”, European Banking Institute Working Paper Series, 2017, no. 14, p. 
28. 
10 ZETZSCHE, D., BUCKLEY, R. P. and ARNER, D. W., supra, loc. cit., p. 34.  
11 GUILLAUME, F., “Aspects of private international law related to blockchain transactions”, supra, loc. 
cit., pp. 67-68.  
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II. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SMART CONTRACTS’ LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
1. Definition of blockchain-based smart contracts 
 
Let us take as an example the case of a flood insurance contract whereby the insurer is 
obliged to satisfy a certain indemnity to the insured party in exchange for a premium, 
providing that the insured party sustains losses, covered by that insurance policy, as a 
result of water damages caused by the flooding, or another example would be a contract 
of carriage whereby an airline company obliges itself to pay the passenger a certain 
amount of money if the flight is delayed. Now, let us imagine that a software code 
performs by automation the payment’s contractual obligations of the abovementioned 
contracts replacing, thus, any human intervention in relation to that particular obligation. 
These two latter case scenarios show the existence of a smart contract (self-executing 
computer code) underlying the contractual agreement. Indeed, the payment obligation in 
both contracts can be satisfied using the smart contract (self-executing computer code) by 
means of transferring the respective amounts of money from the payers’ (either the insurer 
company or the airline) crypto wallets (cyber accounts) to the addressees’ (either the 
insured party or the passenger) crypto wallets (cyber accounts). In addition, the 
communication of the loss, that is to say, the notification of the flood and the delay of the 
flight respectively, to the smart contract (self-executing computer code) could also be 
automated if oracles were used.12    
 
These examples illustrate that the starting point of any approach to the concept of smart 
contract lies in the technological factor: a self-executing computer code. Thus, the 
concept of smart contract refers to the existence of a computer or software code13 capable 
of executing a given protocol upon the occurrence of particular conditions.    
 
What is more, nowadays most of the proposals for a definition of the term “smart 
contract” integrate the blockchain technology into the definition itself because this 
technology has enhanced the functionality of smart contracts in comparison to the original 
examples of such contracts. Thus, blockchain technology has rendered smart contracts 
 
12 Oracles are third-party services that provide external information to the blockchain-based smart contract 
in order to help all of the conditions and terms of the smart contract to execute properly. An example of an 
oracle platform is, for instance, Provable Oracle Blockchain (https://provable.xyz/). 
For the concept and functions of oracles see, among others, TUR FERNÁNDEZ, C., Smart contracts. 
Análisis jurídico, Reus, 2018, pp. 112-114; CARIA, R. de, “Between Law and Code”, in DiMATTEO, L. 
A., CANNARSA, M. and PONCIBÒ, C. (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Smart Contracts, Blockchain 
Technology and Digital Platforms, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020, p. 29 (pp. 19-36); 
TJONG TJIN TAI, E., “Implementing Excuses”, supra, loc. cit., pp. 83-84; MIK, E., “Blockchains. A 
Technology for Decentralized Marketplaces”, in DiMATTEO, L. A, CANNARSA, M. and PONCIBÒ, C. 
(eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Smart Contracts, Blockchain Technology and Digital Platforms, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020, pp. 175-176 (pp. 160-182). 
13 See, for instance, TANK, M., WHITAKER, D. and FRY, P., “Chapter 2: Smart Contracts, Blockchain 
and Commercial Law”, in SMART CONTRACT ALLIANCE, Smart Contracts: Is the Law Ready?, 
September 2018, p. 37 (pp. 36-49), available at: https://digitalchamber.org/smart-contracts-whitepaper/; 
LOW, K. F. K. and MIK, E., “Pause the Blockchain Legal Revolution”, International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, Vol. 69, January 2020, p. 165 (pp. 135-175). 
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self-executing, immutable and permanent, if we consider the general characteristics 
attributable to blockchain technology.  
 
In this regard, some of the current definitions of a smart contract describe such a contract 
as a “piece of special purpose code that executes a complex set of instructions on the 
blockchain”14, or as “a piece of code which is stored on a Blockchain, triggered by 
Blockchain transactions15, and which reads and writes data in that Blockchain’s data 
base”16 or, even, as “immutable computer programs that run deterministically in the 
context of an Ethereum Virtual Machine as part of the Ethereum network protocol” in the 
Ethereum network context.17 The same meaning has been laid down in some legal 
systems such as in Arizona, whose provision 44-7061 E2 declares that a “"smart contract" 
means an event-driven program, with state, that runs on a distributed, decentralized, 
shared and replicated ledger and that can take custody over and instruct transfer of assets 
on that ledger”.18   
 
Additionally, the term smart contract may also have legal implications when it stands for 
a contractual agreement. Indeed, as can graphically be pointed out “there is a Frankenstein 
dimension to a smart contract: an instrument that fuses something innately human, 
entering into and enforcing agreements, with something mechanical, derived from 
scientific experiments”19. This statement indicates the two most significant elements 
intertwined in the smart contract concept from a legal view: an agreement between two 
or more parties and a computer code. In other words, the will of the parties is expressed 
in computer code. This approach was adopted by N. Szabo when defining, for the first 
time, smart contracts as a “set of promises specified in digital form including protocols 
within which the parties perform on these promises” and that was illustrated by the 
example of the vending machine as explained at the introduction of this paper.20 In this 
same vein, some authors have coined the expression smart legal contracts21 to refer to 
contractual agreements expressed in the smart contract self-executing computer code. 
 
14 TAPSCOTT, D., and TAPSCOTT, A., Blockchain Revolution: How the Technology Behind Bitcoin and 
Other Crytocurrencies is Changing the World, Portfolio/Penguin, New York, 2018, p. 46. In the same vein, 
see TUR FERNÁNDEZ, C., supra, op. cit., p. 60. 
15 In terms of blockchain, the term “transaction” does not hold legal connotations. Particularly, in the 
context of the Ethereum blockchain, an Ethereum transaction is “basically a request to access a particular 
account with a particular Ethereum address”; ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., Mastering 
Ethereum: Building Smart Contracts and Dapps, O’Reilly, 2018, p. 62.   
16 GREENSPAN, G., “Beware of the impossible Smart Contract”, 12 April 2016, Blockchain News, 
available at: https://www.the-blockchain.com/2016/04/12/beware-of-the-impossible-smart-contract. 
17 ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., supra, op. cit., p. 127. 
18 House Bill 2417/2017 available at: https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/53leg/1r/bills/hb2417p.pdf. 
19 WERBACH, K. and CORNELL, N., “Contracts ex machine”, Vol. 67, Duke Law Journal, 2017, p. 364 
(pp. 313-382). 
20 SZABO, N., “Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets”, supra, loc. cit. 
21 This same term has already been used by other scholars such as STARK, J., “Making sense of Blockchain 
Smart Contracts”, June 7, 2016, available at: https://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts; 
TUR FERNÁNDEZ, C., supra. op. cit., p. 60 and pp. 140-141. 
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Additionally, other legal scholars have referred to smart contracts as agreements the 
execution of which is automated22, among many other references and definitions.  
 
Unlike traditional digital contracts in which the execution is subject to human behavior23, 
what makes blockchain-based smart contracts attractive for traders is their self-executing 
nature. Which means that the performance of the coding contractual clauses and terms 
takes place automatically through the nodes (computers) that run the blockchain network 
without requiring the intervention of the contracting parties or any other third parties, 
such as lawyers, agents, banks, notaries or other public or private entities. In the same 
vein, smart contracts are also deterministic because they only execute what has been 
coded. To put it another way, the digital code determines what the smart contract may or 
may not execute.24 This is to say, the result of the performance is previously prescribed 
by the code, and by the protocol underlying such a code, and it is the same for everyone 
who runs it.25 This characteristic reveals that only the contracts likely to be executed 
entirely on-line fit into the concept of smart contracts as self-executing contracts. In this 
regard, contracts that entail a payment as an exchange of an asset or service provided on-
line are the ones that best suit this category of contracts. However, smart contracts can 
also be used to execute only some of the obligations of a conventional contractual 
agreement like the payment obligation, as will be examined below. From this, it also 
follows that blockchain-based smart contracts are not a new substantive category of 
contracts, but rather a form that the contracting parties may adopt to externalize and 
perform their contractual obligation. 
 
The smart contract’s self-executing and deterministic nature, in its purest and 
technological sense, obliges contracting parties to envisage all possible legal situations as 
well as ensuring the performance of the contracting parties’ obligations as a result of the 
smart contract’s performance being automated (run by the nodes of the blockchain 
network). Consequently, strictly speaking, in terms of technology or computation, a 
breach of smart contract is not possible.26 This is what, in the legal scenario, has been 
interpreted as an absence of the law to be involved in this digital world. Let us take again 
the example of the case of a flood insurance smart contract whereby the insurer is obliged 
to satisfy a certain indemnity to the insured party, in exchange for a premium, if the 
insured party sustains losses, covered by the insurance policy, as a result of water 
damages caused by the flooding. In this situation, the contract cannot be breached if the 
contracting parties’ obligations are exclusively dependent on the smart contract as a self-
 
22 RASKIN, M., “The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts”, Vol. 1, Georgetown Law Technology Review, 
2017, p. 309 (pp. 305-341). 
23 For an analysis of the evolution of digital agreements, see WERBACH, K. and CORNELL, N., supra, 
loc. cit., pp. 320-324. 
24 CATCHLOVE, P., “Smart Contracts: A New Era of Contract Use”, December 2017, p. 16, available at: 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3090226, p. 16. 
25 ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., supra, op. cit., p. 128. 
26 WERBACH, K., “Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law”, Issue 33, Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal, 2018, pp. 528-529 (pp. 489-552); WERBACH, K. and CORNELL, N., supra, loc. cit., pp. 
331-333; SAVELYEV, A., “Contract Law 2.0: “Smart” Contracts as the beginning of the end of classic 
Law”, Working Papers, Series: Law, National Research University, Higher School of Economics, WP BRP 
71/LAW/2016, p. 15, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885241. 
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executing contract, insofar as all of these obligations are automated and, therefore, do not 
depend on the contracting parties will and subsequent actions any more. As a result, on a 
theoretical level, non-enforcement by courts or arbitrators is needed since the smart 
contract cannot be breached insofar as the smart contract will automatedly proceed to 
satisfy the indemnity to the insured party once such a contract receives the external input 
(through the oracle) of the flooding on the insured party’s property. Moreover, even in 
the event of having a judicial decision holding a smart contract to be enforceable, this 
judgment could not undo the results of the automated contractual obligations27 because 
their execution depends exclusively on a software program that cannot be altered once it 
has been stored on the blockchain. Therefore, in this scenario, a new smart contract should 
be concluded between the original parties in order to enforce the aforementioned 
agreement undoing the effects of the previous smart contract.28 In other situations, the 
collaboration of a participant in the blockchain network would be required to ensure the 
enforcement of the judicial decision. 
 
In order to illustrate how the software coding language of a smart contract blends the two 
technological and legal approaches of this term, we might examine the case of a “Safe 
remote purchase”29. This example, retrieved from the website Solidity30, illustrates the 
problematic issue of dealing with the risk of the arrival of the goods at the buyer’s 
premises. In this scenario, the smart contract is an escrow agreement drawn up to protect 
both parties. Thus, both of them must place into the smart contract twice the value of the 
goods sold. The seller will not recoup the given amount plus the value of the goods until 
the buyer confirms the receipt of the goods. On occurrence of this confirmation, the buyer 
will also get half of the value placed back. The smart contract itself will proceed to 
transfer both amounts of money without the intervention of either the counterparties or 
other third parties (self-executing function). Pursuant to the above-mentioned transaction, 
the digital coded agreement is represented as follows: 
 
 
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0 
pragma solidity ^0.7.0; 
 
contract Purchase {      
uint public value;      
address payable public seller; 
address payable public buyer;       
 
 
27 WERBACH, K. and CORNELL, N., supra, loc. cit., p. 333. 
28 LEHMANN, M., “Who Owns Bitcoin? Private Law Facing the Blockchain”, Volume 21, Minnesota 
Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 2020, Issue 1, p. 120 (pp. 93-136). 
29 The example is accessible on: https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.7.4/solidity-by-example.html#safe-
remote-purchase. 
30 Solidity is the computational language mostly used by Ethereum as a public blockchain interface. Other 
high-level smart contract programming languages executed by Ethereum are LLL, Serpent and Mutan, 
ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., supra, op. cit., p. 300. On Ethereum see: 
https://ethereum.org/en/. 
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enum State { Created, Locked, Release, Inactive }      
// The state variable has a default value of the first member,`State.created`      
State public state;       
 
modifier condition(bool _condition) {          
require(_condition);          
_;      
}       
modifier onlyBuyer() {          
require(              
msg.sender == buyer,              
"Only buyer can call this."          
);          
_;      
}       
modifier onlySeller() {          
require(              
msg.sender == seller,              
"Only seller can call this."          
);          
_;      
}       
modifier inState(State _state) {          
require(              
state == _state,              
"Invalid state."          
);          
_;      
}       
event Aborted();      
event PurchaseConfirmed();      
event ItemReceived();      
event SellerRefunded();       
 
// Ensure that `msg.value` is an even number.      
// Division will truncate if it is an odd number.      
// Check via multiplication that it wasn't an odd number.      
constructor() public payable {          
seller = msg.sender;          
value = msg.value / 2;          
require((2 * value) == msg.value, "Value has to be even.");      
}       
/// Abort the purchase and reclaim the ether.      
/// Can only be called by the seller before      
/// the contract is locked.      
function abort()          
Blockchain-based smart contracts and conflict rules for business-to-business operations 
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public          
onlySeller          
inState(State.Created)      
{          
emit Aborted();          
state = State.Inactive;          
// We use transfer here directly. It is          
// reentrancy-safe, because it is the          
// last call in this function and we          
// already changed the state.          
seller.transfer(address(this).balance);      
}       
/// Confirm the purchase as buyer.      
/// Transaction has to include `2 * value` ether.      
/// The ether will be locked until confirmReceived      
/// is called.      
function confirmPurchase()          
public          
inState(State.Created)          
condition(msg.value == (2 * value))          
payable      
{          
emit PurchaseConfirmed();          
buyer = msg.sender;          
state = State.Locked;      
}       
/// Confirm that you (the buyer) received the item.      
/// This will release the locked ether.      
function confirmReceived()          
public          
onlyBuyer          
inState(State.Locked)      
{          
emit ItemReceived();          
// It is important to change the state first because          
// otherwise, the contracts called using `send` below          
// can call in again here.          
state = State.Release;           
 
buyer.transfer(value);      
}       
/// This function refunds the seller, i.e.      
/// pays back the locked funds of the seller.      
function refundSeller()          
public          
onlySeller          
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inState(State.Release)      
{          
emit SellerRefunded();          
// It is important to change the state first because          
// otherwise, the contracts called using `send` below          
// can call in again here.          
state = State.Inactive;           
 




2. Blockchain technology improves smart contracts’ functionalities 
 
As noted above, blockchain technology has made smart contracts self-executing, 
immutable and permanent. This sort of technology was created by Satoshi Nakomoty so 
as to promote and transact with the virtual currency Bitcoin.31  
 
Pursuant to its literal meaning, blockchain is a chain of blocks. However, when it comes 
to  technological and computational perspectives, the unequivocal definition disappears 
in favor of different ones with specific connotations depending on the features attributable 
to each of them.32 Thus, blockchain may be defined as a computational tool, program, 
software or database used for being run either as a ledger33 storing data, normally in an 
immutable way, or as a transactional platform on which to operate and record the 
transactions concluded therein.34 The main difference between both approaches to the 
term blockchain lies in the fact that the first approach denies the idea that blockchain can 
move assets since it only registers changes of state. Nevertheless, the evolution of this 
technology has combined the two approaches, thus referring to the term blockchain as “a 
 
31 NAKAMOTO, S., “Bitcoin: Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”, 2008, available at: 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. The identity, whether it is a natural person or a legal entity, of Satoshi 
Nakamoto remains still anonymous. 
In July 2020, the total USD value of Bitcoin in circulation was approximately of 173.768$ billion. The 
Bitcoin network, using Bitcoin as its cryptocurrency, was also the blockchain most widely used during the 
year 2019 as the amount of 155,490,287$ spent on the network in fees by the users indicates; “Market 
Capitalization” available at: https://www.blockchain.com/charts/market-cap. Besides, “Bitcoin’s price 
nearly doubled in 2019 despite dampened media coverage. Goldman Sachs named it the best-performing 
asset in 2019. However, since the coronavirus sell-off, BTC is down ~30% YTD”, CBINSIGHTS, The 
Blockchain Report 2020, 2020, p. 4, available at https://www.cbinsights.com/research/report/blockchain-
report-2020/ 
32 For instance, for the characteristics attributable to Ethereum see ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, 
G., supra, op. cit., p. 2. In relation to Bitcoin blockchain’s characteristics see, among others, 
ANTONOPOULOS, A. M., Mastering Bitcoin, O’Reilly, 2019, pp. 1-2, p. 25, p. 158, p. 196 and p. 200.  
33 See MIK, E., supra, loc. cit., p. 162 and p. 170. This interpretation makes the difference between the 
register or ledger itself and the program running the transactions on the blockchain very clear, as is the case 
with Ethereum in which Ethereum Virtual Machine, as a computation engine, is in charge of running the 
transactions to update the Ethereum state. See on this aspect, ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., 
supra, op. cit., p. 297, p. 300 and p. 303. 
34 GUILLAUME, F., “Aspects of private international law related to blockchain transactions”, supra, loc. 
cit., p. 49. 
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species of distributed databases that are maintained by a network of geographically 
dispersed computers, or ‘nodes’”.35 Therefore, the blockchain ecosystem may cover the 
ledger, the network and the consensus protocol.36 
 
Originally, Satoshi Nakamoto built up the Bitcoin blockchain network as a digital 
decentralized (peer-to-peer) network composed of distributed nodes37 (computers) that 
store a full, public and identical record of timestamped transactions (bitcoin) made in the 
blockchain as a result of all of them being validated by the above-mentioned nodes38 and 
being incorporated (through the mining39 process) permanently into time-ordered blocks. 
One of the Bitcoin network’s purposes was avoiding the so-called double-spending 
problem40 whereby one party could dispose of its bitcoins more than once without any 
trusted third party controlling bitcoin issuances and transfers of them. Making the 
blockchain immutable (unmodifiable) avoids this problem.  
 
Bitcoin network is a permissionless, public and decentralized blockchain because anyone 
willing to transact in the blockchain can join the network without disclosing his or her 
identity and also any user may read the cryptographed transactions stored therein 
(transparency). As a consequence, the whole community of nodes (decentralized 
community) controls the transaction process, thereby rendering the network tamper-
proof. The same characteristics are attributable to another blockchain especially created 
to run smart contracts -the Ethereum blockchain.41 The main difference, thus, between 
both sorts of blockchain lies in the fact that while Bitcoin blockchain is principally a 
digital currency payment network, Ethereum was primarily created to execute smart 
contracts,42 without neglecting its capacity to accommodate payments as well. 
 
As for the permissionless and public features, users of blockchain networks, rather than 
trusting the authority of a trusted third party (intermediaries such as, for instance, a 
lawyer, a notary, a bank or other public or private authorities), can place their trust in the 
 
35 LOW, K. F. K. and MIK, E., supra, loc. cit., p. 137. 
36 WERBACH, K. and CORNELL, N., supra, loc. cit., p. 326.  
37 The functionalities that nodes may carry out depend on the particular blockchain on which they operate. 
For instance, they may be “full nodes” capable of validating and storing all the transactions run on the 
network or just able to deploy some of their functions. 
38 The nodes collect fees as a reimbursement for their validation work.  
39 Technically speaking, this term refers to the programming process whereby the nodes (computers 
connected to the network) incorporate the transaction on a new block which, in turn, is added to the chain. 
The programming process consists of “finding a solution to the Proof-of-Work algorithm that makes the 
block valid”, ANTONOPOULOS, A. M., supra, op. cit., p. 192. In its operational meaning, “mining is the 
process of hashing the block header repeatedly, changing one parameter, until the resulting hash matches a 
specific target”, ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., supra, op. cit., pp. 321-322 in relation to the 
mining process on Ethereum. 
40 NAKAMOTO, S., supra, loc. cit., p. 12 available at: https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
41 See https://ethereum.org/en/. And as a general and complete guide on Ethereum, see also 
ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., supra, op. cit. 
42 ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., supra, op. cit., pp. 1-3; IDELBERGER, F., “Connected 
contracts reloaded – Smart contracts as contractual networks”, in GRUNDMANN, S. (ed.), European 
Contract Law in the digital age, Intersentia, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland, 2018, p. 207 (pp. 205-235). 
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computer code underlying the blockchain technology.43 This, in turn, corresponds to 
saving in transaction costs. Indeed, permissionless blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum 
are decentralized in the sense that the governance of the blockchain is spread out over the 
nodes with all of them being equal (peer-to-peer). Indeed, none of them centralizes the 
governance of the blockchain44, this is to say, there is no central administrator or 
designated authority. And the consensus45 is the mechanism utilized by the nodes in order 
to approve and incorporate (mining) the transactions into the time-ordered block. 
Therefore, blockchain technology presents itself as a self-regulatory system not 
dependent on States, but only on the computer protocol and nodes that comprise the 
blockchain network.46 
 
Furthermore, the trust in the code also justifies the pseudonymous character of 
permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. Indeed, users of either of these 
do not have to identify themselves when acting on the networks. They only have to 
download the appropriate software of the blockchain and the type of client they wish to 
run. In order to guarantee their anonymity and operate inside the blockchain, all the clients 
(users) hold two keys (private and public) that allow them to be identified through a public 
address but without ever revealing their private identities at any time. It is, needless to 
say, this very anonymity and, to some extent, untraceability47 that may render obtaining 
legal remedies particularly difficult48 (this situation is qualified as “Know Your 
Customer”), as I will analyze below when dealing with the law governing blockchain-
based smart contracts.  
 
Conversely, clients of permissioned blockchains such as, for example, Hyperledger49 or 
R3 Corda50, must satisfy the requirements established by the entity or organization 
controlling the blockchain in order to access the aforementioned blockchains. Thus, these 
clients are completely known, since they have to disclose their identities. This condition 
enables us, among other aspects, to hold them accountable for their acts and, in turn, has 
 
43 MIK, E., supra, loc. cit., p. 163.  
44 ANTONOPOULOS, A. M., supra, op. cit., p. 139. 
45 The consensus protocol may vary depending on the blockchain. The most well-known consensus protocol 
is proof-of-work, used in the Bitcoin Blockchain and Ethereum Blockchain. However, proof-of-stake is 
going to be implemented in Ethereum, thereby replacing proof-of-work. On this aspect, see: 
https://docs.ethhub.io/ethereum-roadmap/ethereum-2.0/proof-of-stake/. 
46 See, among others, MÖSLEIN, F., “Conflict of Laws and Codes: Defining the Boundaries of Digital 
Jurisdictions”, July 2018, pp. 3-5, available at SSRN: http:ssrn.com/abstract=3174823; GUILLAUME, F. 
F., “Aspects of private international law related to blockchain transactions”, supra, loc. cit., pp. 71-72; 
LEHMANN, M., supra, loc. cit., p. 117. 
47 With regard to traceability, it is noteworthy that an “Internet service provider like Time Warner that 
assign IP addresses do keep records linking identities to accounts. Likewise, if you get a bitcoin wallet from 
a licensed online exchange such as Coinbase, that exchange is required to do its diligence under AML/KYC 
requirements. […] So governments can subpoena ISPs and exchanges for this type of user data. But they 
can’t subpoena the blockchain”, TAPSCOTT, D., and TAPSCOTT, A., supra, op. cit., p. 44. 
48 MÖSLEIN, F., supra, loc. cit., p. 16. 
49 See https://www.hyperledger.org/. 
50 See https://www.r3.com/corda-platform/. 
Blockchain-based smart contracts and conflict rules for business-to-business operations 
- 13 - DOI: 10.17103/reei.41.16 
made permissioned blockchains especially interesting for supporting commercial 
operations.51  
 
Finally, Bitcoin, Ethereum and public blockchains in general also stand out because of 
the immutability or irreversibility of the information recorded in them. In this regard, the 
data or value stored on the blockchain remains immutable for the sake of the protection 
of the parties involved in the operation, but also of third parties interested in it, because, 
as a general rule, no one party, either unilaterally or by agreement, holds the right to edit, 
update or reverse transactions already recorded on the blockchain. This being said, the 
original contracting parties could reach a new agreement in order to reverse or extend the 
previous one. What is more, as regards the Ethereum blockchain in particular, its protocol 
contemplates the self-destruction function aimed at deleting the smart contract only if the 
smart contract code embeds such a possibility52. By contrast, permissioned blockchains 
allow the central administrator or the designated authority to alter or modify the 
transactions already stored.53 
 
Nevertheless, immutability may pose some doubts concerning, among others, its 
alignment with the General Data Protection Regulation54 and the right to be forgotten.55 
Thus, some computer scientists56 have invented a solution especially designed for 
permissioned blockchains insofar as a trusted third party will be in charge of the editing. 
“The invention modifies existing blockchain technology to allow designated authorities 
to edit, rewrite or remove previous blocks of information without breaking the chain”.57 
 
51 See GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ, L. C., POLO TOLÓN, M. and MOLERO MANGLANO, I., “Capítulo 12: 
Tecnologías blockchain”, in PREUKSCHAT, A., Blockchain: la revolución industrial de internet, Gestión 
2000, Grupo Planeta, 2017, Location 3521; BitFury GROUP, “Public versus Private Blockchains, Part 1: 
Permissioned Blockchains, White Paper”, October 20, 2015, p. 3, available at: 
https://bitfury.com/content/downloads/public-vs-private-pt1-1.pdf; MEKKI, M., “Blockchain: l’exemple 
des smart contrats entre innovation et précaution”, May 2018, p. 2 and p. 10, accessible at: 
https://www.mekki.fr/files/sites/37/2018/05/Smart-contracts.pdf; MIK, E., supra, loc. cit., p. 164; 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Blockchain for supply chains and international trade. Report on key 
features, impacts and policy options, May 2020, p. 6, pp. 68-69 and p. 114 available at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/641544/EPRS_STU(2020)641544_EN.pdf. 
52 ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., supra, op. cit., pp. 143-145; MARINO, B. and JVELS, A., 
“Setting Standards for Altering and Undoing Smart Contracts”, RuleML, 2016, p. 158 (pp. 151-166), 
available at: https://www.arijuels.com/publications/ . 
53 See MIK, E., supra, loc. cit., pp. 171-172. 
54 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 27 April 2016, on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119/1. 
55 For example, see TAMARGO, M., “Conflicto entre la tecnología blockchain y la normativa de protección 
de datos”, Economist and Jurist, 4 August 2020, available at: https://www.economistjurist.es/noticias-
juridicas/conflicto-entre-la-tecnologia-blockchain-y-la-normativa-de-proteccion-de-datos/  
56 ATENIESE, G., MAGRI, B., VENTURI, D. and ANDRADE, E., “Redactable Blockchain - or – 
Rewriting History in Bitcoin and Friends”, May 11, 2017, p. 6, available at: 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/757.pdf . 
   
57 LUMB, R., TREAT, D., and JELF, O., “Editing the Uneditable Blockchain. Why distributed ledger 
technology must adapt to an imperfect world”, 2016, p. 7, available at: 
https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/pdf-33/accenture-editing-uneditable-blockchain.pdf#zoom=50 
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It is, however, this very solution which undermines the disintermediation characteristic 
attributable to some blockchain technologies.58 
 
 
III. THE LAW APPLICABLE TO BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SMART CONTRACTS 
 
1. Relevance of determining the law applicable to blockchain-based smart contracts 
 
It is been occasionally said that smart contracts could replace lawyers59, albeit this is an 
overstatement considering that any contract properly performed does not require the 
assistance of lawyers, or that its mathematical universal language ensures uniform 
execution of these kinds of contracts thereby making the differences in national laws 
irrelevant60 and even rendering useless the recourse to any law. The self-executing nature 
of blockchain-based smart contracts has led to such interpretations insofar as once they 
have been digitally coded and stored in the blockchain, their performance depends 
exclusively on the conditions or transactions61 encoded in the particular smart contract, 
on the blockchain and, when necessary, on the so-called oracles.62  
 
In any event, though, the contracting parties retain the right to access justice in order to 
have their contractual agreements enforced by either judicial or arbitral authorities 
regardless of them having opted for automatizing their contractual relationship insofar as 
the existence and material validity of the contractual obligation does not depend on the 
technology. To sum up, “smart contracts may be outside the law, but they are not above 
the law”.63  
 
As a result, with regard to the enforcement of smart contracts, the reasons that may lead 
contracting parties to seek recourse to justice may be associated with different reasons. 
For instance, a deficient performance of the smart contract due to software programming 
bugs that affect the digital code or result in a failure in the system that produces an 
unexpected result or discrepancies between the conventional contractual terms and 
 
58 GARCÍA-TERUEL, R. M., “Legal challenges and opportunities of blockchain technology in the real 
estate sector”, Vol. 12, Journal of Property, Planning and Environmental Law, 2020, Issue 2, p. 141 (pp. 
129-145). 
59 OZELLI, S., “Smart Contracts are Taking Over Functions of Lawyers: Expert blog”, January 12, 2018, 
available at: https://cointelegraph.com/news/smart-contracts-are-taking-over-functions-of-lawyers-expert-
blog. 
60 SAVELYEV, A., supra, loc. cit., p. 21. 
61 In the Ethereum scenario, smart contracts can only be run if they are called by transactions; 
ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., supra, op. cit., p. 125 and p. 128. And an Ethereum transaction 
is “basically a request to access a particular account with a particular Ethereum address”; 
ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., supra, op. cit., p. 62.   
62 On oracles see supra, footnote 12. 
For the concept and functions of oracles see, among others, TUR FERNÁNDEZ, C., supra, op. cit., pp. 
112-114; CARIA, R. de, supra, loc. cit., p. 29; TJONG TJIN TAI, E., “Implementing Excuses”, supra, loc. 
cit., pp. 83-84; MIK, E., supra, loc. cit., pp. 175-176.  
63 PONCIBÒ, C. and DiMATTEO, L. A., “Contractual and Noncontractual Remedies”, in DiMATTEO, L. 
A., CANNARSA, M. and PONCIBÒ, C. (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Smart Contracts, Blockchain 
Technology and Digital Platforms, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020, p. 121 (pp. 118-140). 
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conditions and their digital version, when two versions of the contractual terms exist.64  
In addition, there is also the possibility of including certain provisions in the smart 
contract to be executed at some time in the future that cannot eventually be performed65 
in the case of a contracting party being bankrupted, for example, or even when a situation 
arises in which either of the two parties to the smart contract may have been induced by 
fraud, duress or undue influence to conclude the contract.66 Even though all of these 
foregoing operations are effective pursuant to the blockchain, because blockchain 
technology keeps itself external to these technical and legal problems, the recourse to 
judicial or arbitral authorities remains available for the aggrieved party and, as a 
consequence, questions regarding the competent jurisdiction and the applicable law may 
arise. In this context, the nature of the blockchain-based smart contract may determine 
the answer to these questions, as will be explained in the following paragraph in relation 
to the governing law. What remains, clear, however, is that programming language does 
not render conflict-of-law rules useless67, and as a consequence, the questions to be 
answered are: to what extent do the current conflict-of-law rules accommodate 
blockchain-based smart contracts in their substantive scope? and can they be appropriate 
for designating the law which governs them?  
 
2. Material versus formal validity of blockchain-based smart contracts 
 
Consequently, when it comes to determining the law applicable to blockchain-based 
smart contracts, a first distinction must be drawn between substance and form, in spite of 
the opinion that substance and form are closely and logically related.68 What is more, 
most of the time it is very difficult to draw the distinction between form and substance.69 
And, blockchain-based smart contracts illustrate such a level of complexity in the sense 
that these contracts are conceived as digital self-executing contracts that unavoidably 
require the contractual terms and conditions to be computationally drawn up in order for 
the software to execute such contractual clauses. Therefore, the computer code language 
or computational language is a formal requirement which is inextricably related to the 
essence and effectiveness of blockchain-based smart contracts themselves, insofar as if 
 
64 See, for instance, CARIA, R. de, supra, loc. cit., p. 36; SAVELYEV, A., supra, loc. cit., p. 14; 
INTERNATIONAL SWAP AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, supra, loc. cit., p. 22; UK 
JURISDICTION TASKFORCE, supra, loc. cit., p. 31; GUILLAUME, F., “Aspects of private international 
law related to blockchain transactions”, supra, loc. cit., pp. 66-67.  
65 FARREL. S., MACHIN, H., and HINCHLIFFE, R., “Lost and found in smart contract translation -
considerations in transitioning to automation in legal architecture”, in UNCITRAL, Modernizing 
International Trade Law to Support Innovation and Sustainable Development, Vienna 4 – 6 July 2017, 
Volume 4: Papers presented at the Congress, United Nations, Vienna, 2017, p. 100 (pp. 95-104).  
66 LEHMANN, M., supra, loc. cit., p. 103. 
67 By contrast, it has been suggested that conflict-of-laws provisions are not needed, “since there are no 
collisions of various legal systems. Mathematics is universal human language. Thus, Smart contracts are 
truly transnational and executed uniformly regardless of the differences in national laws”; CATCHLOVE, 
P., supra, loc. cit., p. 21. 
68 VERSCHRAEGEN, B., “Article 11”, in MANKOWSKI, M., Rome I Regulation -Commentary, 
European Commentaries on Private International Law, Volume II, Sellier European Law Publishers, 
Ottoschmidt, Köln, 2017, p. 695 (pp. 671-716). 
69 VERSCHRAEGEN, B., supra, op. cit., p. 691. 
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that computational language is lacking, then the contract will not produce the expected 
self-executing effects (automation).70  
 
However, the elements needed for a binding contract to exist are, generally speaking, the 
consent of the contracting parties to be bound, the existence of a valid object and 
consideration or cause. In terms of European Union conflict rules, all of these 
abovementioned elements refer to the existence and substance of the contract as governed 
by the law, and which would govern the contract if it were valid (Article 10.1 of the Rome 
I Regulation).71 Particularly, when it comes to the question as to whether smart contracts 
are covered by the Rome I Regulation, the answer will depend on whether they are 
included in the material scope of application of such a Regulation and, therefore, within 
the concept of “contractual obligation”. In this regard, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union is developing an autonomous interpretation of the concept of 
“contractual obligation”. Indeed, the Court of Justice has given several judgments for 
laying the foundations of an autonomous concept of contractual obligation within the 
context of jurisdiction that should govern in the conflict of laws field as well.72 Pursuant 
to this interpretation, the Court of Justice has stated that the expression “matters relating 
to contract” is not to be understood as covering a situation in which there is no obligation 
freely consented by one party towards another or assumed by two parties and on which 
the claimant’s action is based.73 “The conduct complained of may be considered a breach 
of contract, which may be established by taking into account the purpose of the 
contract”.74 
 
By contrast, the form of the contract refers to “every external manifestation required on 
the part of a person expressing the will to be legally bound, and in the absence of which 
such expression of will would not be regarded as fully effective”75. In terms of 
blockchain-based smart contracts, the form (Article 11 of the Rome I Regulation), then, 
should cover aspects such as, for example, the computational language needed for running 
the smart contract; whether cryptographic signatures of the contracting parties to the 
smart contract are required; the requirement of whether, in addition to the digital coding 
 
70 For example, FELIU REY, J., “Smart Contract: Concepto, ecosistema y principales cuestiones de 
Derecho privado”,  Diario La Ley mercantil,  nº 47, mayo 2018, pp. 4-6 (15pp.).  
71 However, Article 10.2 of the Rome I Regulation makes applicable the law in force in the country of the 
habitual residence of the party alleging that he did not consent. 
72 See for instance, Recital 7 of the Rome I Regulation calling for consistency between the substantive 
scopes of application and provisions of this Regulation itself and the Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 
of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, nowadays replaced by the Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (OJ L351/1). 
73 See, for example, Judgment 17 June 1992, Handte, C-26/91, ECLI:EU:C:1992:268, paragraph 15; 
Judgment 17 September 2002, Tacconi, C-334/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:499, paragraph 23; Judgment 5 
February 2004, Frahuil, C-265/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:77, paragraph 24; Judgment 18 July 2013, ÖFAB, C-
147/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:490, paragraphs 32 and 33 and Judgment 10 September 2015, Holterman Ferho 
Exploitatie and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:574, paragraph 52. 
74 Judgment of 13 March 2014, Brogsitter, C-548/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:148, paragraphs 24 and 29. 
75 Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by Giuliano, M. & Lagarde, 
P. [1980] OJEC C 282/29. 
Blockchain-based smart contracts and conflict rules for business-to-business operations 
- 17 - DOI: 10.17103/reei.41.16 
contract, a human readable language copy is needed or whether a certain amount of copies 
are also requested. In respect of all of these aspects, the issue of human readable language 
has aroused especial attention since some authors subject it to the law governing the 
formal validity (Article 11 of the Rome I Regulation), whereas others consider the lex 
causae more appropriate to govern it76. The reasons in favor of submitting natural 
language to the lex causae refers to the close connection between the purposes sought by 
language, such as to ensure reflection and caution, to reinforce the contracting parties’ 
feeling to be bound and to ease the evidence of the contractual obligations assumed and, 
on the other hand, the existence and effectiveness of the contract itself.77 However, this 
justification is the same as the justification upon which the ad solemnitatem form is based. 
 
As far as blockchain-based smart contracts are concerned, though, the computational 
language requirement should be governed by the law as appointed by the conflict-of-law 
rule laid down in Article 11 of the Rome I Regulation for the formal validity of contractual 
obligations. Indeed, computational language does not interfere in the existence of the 
contractual obligations insofar as these obligations are concerned and, as a consequence, 
contractual relationships do exist provided that they comply with the conditions required 
by the law governing the contract if it were valid (Article 10.1 of the Rome I Regulation). 
This is also why the contracting parties’ right to obtain legal remedies remain intact 
regardless of the existence of the computer code or its correct functioning.  
 
To sum up, insofar as a given smart contract accords with the interpretation given by the 
Court of Justice, that is to say, that such a contract represents either an obligation freely 
assumed by one party towards another or the agreement between two or more parties, this 
contract could be subject to the conflict-of-law rules laid down in the Rome I Regulation 
in order to determine the law governing the controversial contractual agreement 
externalized on a blockchain-based smart contract. In addition, the putative law of the 
contract will apply to the existence and material validity of such a contract (Article 10.1 
of the Rome I Regulation). Therefore, this law applies, among others, to the contracts’ 
formation even though the admissibility of blockchain-based smart contracts as a formal 
tool for expressing the contracting parties’ declarations, is subject to the law governing 
the formal validity (Article 11 of the Rome I Regulation). This difference between 
formation of the contract and admissibility of an electronic form of the contracting 
parties’ declarations can be found, for instance, in Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce, of 199678 whereby “in the context of contract formation, 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an offer and the acceptance of an offer may be 
expressed by means of data messages. Where a data message is used in the formation of 
a contract, that contract shall not be denied validity or enforceability on the sole ground 
that a data message was used for that purpose”. From a Spanish Law perspective, Article 
23.1 of the Information Society Services Act establishes that contracts concluded by 
 
76 VERSCHRAEGEN, B., supra, loc. cit., pp. 694-695; LOACKER, L. D., “Article 11 Rome I”, in 
CALLIESS, G.-P., Rome Regulations – Commentary, 2nd Edition, Wolters Kluwer, The Netherlands, 2015, 
pp. 290-291 (pp. 276-306).   
77 VERSCHRAEGEN, B., supra, loc. cit., p. 695. 
78 The text of the UNCITRAL is available at: https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-
documents/uncitral/en/19-04970_ebook.pdf. 
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electronic means will produce the legal effects recognized by the legal system, when 
consent and the other conditions required for its validity concur.79 
 
As a consequence, the favor validitatis principle underlying the conflict-of-law rule 
contained in Article 11 of the Rome I Regulation ensures the effectiveness of the 
blockchain-based smart contracts, in particular when the law applicable to the formal 
validity  does not correspond to the lex contractus, since Article 11 of the Rome I 
Regulation enables the application of other laws other than the lex contractus. In this 
sense, it is worth noting that some national legislations have already and expressly 
recognized the admissibility of blockchain-based smart contracts as a way of 
externalizing legal binding agreements. For example, in the United States some States80 
have already passed legislation on this particular issue, which also include definitions of 
the terms “blockchain” and “smart contract”. In Europe, States such as Italy81 and Malta82 
have expressly embedded the concepts of “distributed ledger technology” and “smart 
contracts”, whereas others83 have merely recognized the validity of distributed ledger 
technology without embracing an express definition of the aforementioned terms.  
 
Overall, once it has been confirmed that a certain contractual agreement sustained in a 
blockchain-based smart contract is covered by the Rome I Regulation, then the conflict-
of-law rules set out in this Regulation will determine the national law applicable to both 
the material and formal validity of the given contract, as I have explained above.  
 
3. Formation of blockchain-based smart contracts 
 
As regards the formation of blockchain-based smart contracts, they may be concluded in 
either of the following ways. First, the paradigmatic way consists of displaying the smart 
contract84 by the user in a permissionless blockchain as a legally binding offer if it meets 
the legal requirements for this offer to be valid in accordance with the appropriate law. 
The transaction called by another user to the former smart contract may amount to an 
 
79 BOE n. 116, 12th July 2002. The Information Society Services Act implements the Directive 2000/31/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') into 
the Spanish legal system. 
80 For example, see in Arizona, Provision 44-7061 E1 and E2 of the House Bill 2417/2017 available at: 
https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/53leg/1r/bills/hb2417p.pdf; in Illinois, the House Bill 3575 (23 August 
2019), available at: https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/101/HB/10100HB3575.htm. 
81 See Article 8 ter of the “Decreto-legge 14 dicembre 2018, n. 135, coordinato con la legge di conversione 
11 febbraio 2019, n. 12, recante: “Dispozioni urgenti in materia di sostegno e simplificazione per le imprese 
e per la pubblica amministrazione”, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Reppublica Italiana, 12 febbraio 2019, Serie 
Generale n. 36, p. 49. 
82 See Part I.2. (i) of the “Bill No. 45, Malta Digital Innovation Authority Bill, 2018”, Government Gazette 
of Malta No. 19,994 (22 May 2018), available at: http://justiceservices.gov.mt/.  
83 For instance, Luxembourg has implemented distributed ledger technology in the field of securities, see 
Article 18 bis of the “Loi du 1er mars 2019 portant modification de la loi modifiée du 1er août 2001 
concernant la circulation des titres”, Journal Officiel du Gran-Duché de Luxembourg, Nº 111 du 5 mars 
2019. 
84 For the creation of a Smart contract into Ethereum blockchain see: ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and 
WOOD, G., supra, op cit., pp. 112-114. 
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acceptance of the encoded operation, which will subsequently be validated, executed and 
stored by the nodes of the blockchain. An example of this would be that of the deployment 
of a smart contract which, in exchange for a cryptoasset, performs algorithmic 
investment.85 In other words, the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) illustrates this sort of 
formation of smart contracts in which one contracting party seeks to collect funds to fund 
a project. In exchange for those funds, the investor will receive tokens to be used in the 
future according to the terms stipulated in the White Paper that founds the ICO. In this 
situation, the smart contract would be concluded between pseudo-anonymous parties 
identified only through their ID addresses and thereby making use of their respective 
public and private key to sign and send the corresponding transactions on the blockchain.  
 
Aside from this, the conclusion of a blockchain-based smart contract may imply the 
negotiation and conclusion of a smart contract between known contracting parties in the 
context of either permissioned or permissionless blockchains. This second scenario is 
likely to adopt an array of different forms86, from concluding a contract entirely and solely 
expressed in digital code to different combinations of digital coding contract and natural 
language contract (wet contract/analog or conventional contract). In this latter category 
of patterns, smart contracts may be deployed according to any of the following forms: 
firstly, the terms and conditions of the agreement may be embedded in a conventional 
contract that is subsequently converted into digital coding language87 to be deployed in 
the blockchain. One example could consist of including in the smart contract a human 
readable contract document in order to make its comprehension easier. In this regard, the 
smart contract user could proceed as follows: the user should upload the human readable 
document to the IPFS (a distributed protocol allowing anyone to store any static data) and 
then, successively, the user should insert a hush (automatically created unique number) 
line into the smart contract referring to the human readable document previously 
uploaded. The latter human document should be accepted (acceptance function) by the 
counterparty for a binding contract to exist.88 Another example of the translation of the 
human readable document into digital or software coding is provided by a project 
developed by the OpenLaw blockchain-based protocol89. To illustrate such a project, 
OpenLaw uses a loan agreement in which no bank or other private or public authority 
intervenes. In order to conclude such a contract, the lender and the borrower may agree 
 
85 UK JURISDICTION TASKFORCE, supra, op. cit., pp. 33-34. Besides, on this type of smart contract, 
see also TJONG TJIN TAI, T., “Implementing Excuses”, supra, loc. cit., pp. 82-83. 
86 See, for instance, SMART CONTRACTS ALLIANCE and DELOITTE, “Smart Contracts: 12 Use Cases 
for Business & Beyond”, 2016, p. 9, available at: https://digitalchamber.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Smart-Contracts-12-Use-Cases-for-Business-and-Beyond_Chamber-of-Digital-
Commerce.pdf; APARICIO BIJUESCA, M. B., “Chapter 1: The challenges associated with smart 
contracts: formation, modification and enforcement”, in SMART CONTRACTS ALLIANCE, Smart 
contracts: Is the Law Ready?, September 2018, pp. 25-28 (pp. 14-35), available at: 
https://digitalchamber.org/smart-contracts-whitepaper/; FELIU REY, J., supra, loc. cit., p. 5. 
87 FARREL. S., MACHIN, H., and HINCHLIFFE, R., supra, loc. cit., p. 96; STARK, J., supra, loc. cit.; 
IDELBERGER, F., GOVERNATON, G., RIVERET, R. and SARTOR, G., “Evaluation of logic-based 
Smart contracts for blockchain systems”, RuleML, 2016, p. 174 (pp. 167-183).   
88 BRAENDGAAR, P., “Simple Convention for Human Readable Terms for Smart Contracts”, Blog Stake 
Ventures, June 29th, 2016, available at: https://blog.stakeventures.com/articles/smart-contract-terms. 
89 The project’s explanation (15 July 2018) is available at: media.consensys.net/blockchain-based-lending-
1eee5edabe8a. 
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upon either creating their loan agreement from whatever template is already available on 
the blockchain or uploading their own standard loan agreement onto this platform. This 
platform enables the contracting parties to write, sign and incorporate the contractual 
terms of the loan agreement drawn up in readable human language into the blockchain by 
means of facilitating their conversion into the markup language accepted by the Ethereum 
network. Once it is on the blockchain, this agreement remains immutable. However, the 
smart contract may be triggered by the calls of the contracting parties whenever they have 
to withdraw additional funds or return the funds and the interests agreed depending on 
the type of loan agreement. Within the framework of this project, the function of funding 
the loan is removed from a centralized financial institution and is conferred upon a 
decentralized application compatible with Ethereum (Metamask90). 
 
The foregoing examples offer slightly different interpretation of the Ricardian Contract 
known as a “document which is legible to both a court of law and to a software 
application” 91 insofar as the same document combines both prose and computer-parsable 
markup.92  
 
This fact, which consists of having the contractual terms and conditions in human 
readable languages ensures the understanding of all of the contractual clauses, not only 
by the contracting parties but also by third trusted authorities such as judges and 
arbitrators, in the event that their interventions being needed. However, a subsequent 
problem arises associated with the risk of discrepancy between the conventional contract 
and the digital coding contract. Indeed, most of the time coders or developers will be in 
charge of translating the contractual clauses written in natural language into digital or 
software coding93 and this task, although assisted by lawyers, may result in 
misinterpretations and coding errors. Some initiatives have sought to eliminate such a 
possibility by integrating the conventional contractual clauses into the new Solidity smart 
contract in the Ethereum blockchain.94 
 
Secondly, another form that smart contracts may adopt consist in dividing the contractual 
terms and conditions into the two languages (natural and digital coding) depending on 
which clauses are more appropriate to be converted into coding language.95 In practice, 
this option could be useful for differentiating the conditional clauses (If A / Then B) 
admitted by the software underling the smart contract and blockchain from those that are 
not suitable because they entail subjective interpretation. For instance, let us take as an 
example  conditional clauses using the conditional language: “If A / Then B” which is the 
clause whereby an airline company obliges itself to pay the passenger a certain amount 
 
90 On Metamask see: https://metamask.io/. 
91 GRIGG, I., “The Ricardian Contract”, available at: http://webfunds.org/guide/ricardian.html. 
92 GRIGG, I., “Towards a Ricardian Constitution”, available at: https://steemit.com/eos/@iang/towards-a-
ricardian-constitution. 
93 What is more, Ethereum, for example, requires smart contracts to be executed on the blockchain to 
convert their high-level language (Solidity, most of the time) into Ethereum Virtual Machine bytecodes, 
ANTONOPOULOS, A. M. and WOOD, G., supra, op. cit., p. 7 and p. 129.  
94 See BRAENDGAAR, P., supra, loc. cit. 
95 CARIA, R. de, supra, loc. cit., pp. 31-32; CATCHLOVE, P., supra, loc. cit.; MEKKI, M., supra, loc. 
cit., p. 12.   
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of money if the flight is delayed or the other clause whereby an insurance company agrees 
to indemnify the insured party in exchange for a given premium, if it rains over a given 
certain level for a certain number of days. By contrast, other contractual clauses requiring 
some subjective interpretation, such as, choice of law or choice of jurisdiction clauses or 
clauses concerning excuses (hardship), even though they can be converted into coding 
clauses, are ultimately not capable of being self-executed on the blockchain.  
 
4. Determining the law governing blockchain-based smart contracts 
 
A) INTRODUCTORY ASPECTS 
 
Many authors have pointed out the importance of determining the competent jurisdiction 
and the law applicable to blockchain-based smart contracts96, while indicating at the same 
time the complex problems associated to the cybersystem in which they are executed 
entirely or partially. In this regard, blockchain-based smart contracts amplify, where 
possible, the problems that electronic commerce causes when ascertaining the law 
governing the aforementioned contracts.97 Indeed, as a paradigmatic illustration, let us 
examine the issue of pseudo-anonymity behind permissionless blockchains that may 
render disputes almost impossible to be adjudicated. Moreover, the geographically-
oriented connecting factors used by most of the conflict-of-law rules make the 
determination of the applicable law even more difficult in the cybersystem scenario in 
which a priori no boundaries exist. Even the closest connecting factor has been found to 
be inappropriate for blockchain technology because of this same de-nationalized nature.98 
 
Therefore, the purpose of the current section is to analyze the extent to which the general 
conflict-of-law rules (Articles 3 and 4) laid down in the Rome I Regulation may be 
appropriate to ascertain the law governing blockchain-based smart contracts. Before 
doing this, three ideas should be borne in mind. Firstly, as I have already indicated, 
blockchain-based smart contracts are not a new substantive category of contracts, but 
rather a form that the contracting parties may adopt to externalize and perform their 
contractual obligation. As a consequence, the appropriate conflict-of-law rule to be 
utilized will depend upon the specific controversial blockchain-based smart contract at 
stake (sale of goods, services, financial services, etc.). Secondly, the analysis of the law 
applicable to blockchain-based smart contracts only refers to the contractual relationship 
established between the parties to it and, therefore, does not focus on other relationships 
that the blockchain technology may generate among founders, developers or coders 
therein, for instance, for coding errors.99   
 
96 For instance, see in DiMATTEO, L. A., CANNARSA, M. and PONCIBÒ, C., “Smart Contracts and 
Contract Law”, in DiMATTEO, L. A., CANNARSA, M. and PONCIBÒ, C. (eds.), The Cambridge 
Handbook of Smart Contracts, Blockchain Technology and Digital Platforms, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2020, p. 4 (pp. 3-18); MEKKI, M., supra, loc. cit., p. 13; CARIA, R. de, supra, loc. cit., p. 32. 
97 CARIA, R. de, supra, loc. cit., p. 34. 
98 LEHMANN, M., supra, loc. cit., p. 112; GUILLAUME, F., “Aspects of private international law related 
to blockchain transactions”, supra, loc. cit., p. 79. 
99 As for cryptocurrency networks, A. Dickinson characterizes as “matters relating to contract” the 
relationships established between the participants to Bitcoin and Ripple, DICKINSON, A., 
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And thirdly, the present analysis also leaves aside other specific conflict-of-law and 
substantive legal instruments that could primarily govern the given blockchain-based 
smart contract if it fell under their respective scopes of application, such as the United 
Nations Convention on contracts for the international sale of goods, 11 April 1980, among 
others.100  
 
B) THE ROME I REGULATION 
 
a) Situation involving a conflict of laws 
 
Broadly speaking, the Rome I Regulation applies to contractual obligations in civil and 
commercial matters that involve a conflict of laws. The concept of contractual obligations 
was tackled above when dealing with smart contracts’ legal implications.101 To sum up, 
a contractual obligation exists in situations in which there is an obligation freely 
consented to by one party towards another or assumed by two or more parties. In addition, 
for this obligation to be subject to the Rome I Regulation, it must be connected to more 
than one just legal system.  
 
As I have already outlined, blockchain-based smart contracts are run (executed) by the 
nodes (computers connected to the network), which form the blockchain network, when 
all of them validate and mine (include in the block) the transactions that users or other 
smart contracts deploy in the blockchain. The nodes’ operations are what make the status 
of the ledger (the blockchain) and that of the smart contract itself change. Nodes are 
situated all over the world, in particular, when it comes to permissionless blockchains. 
This fact has led some authors to affirm that sustaining smart contracts on this 
transnational technology renders these contracts automatically international102, at least in 
relation to permissionless blockchains, insofar as the location of the nodes is disseminated 
over different jurisdictions (those places where the nodes are located). This criterion 
makes the counterparties’ habitual residence criterion irrelevant when it comes to 
evaluating whether or not a smart contract has cross-border connotations.  
 
The criterion based on the location of the nodes (understood as both servers and clients 
in the Peer-to-Peer systems) is taken here as an element to characterize the relevant smart 
contract as international rather than being used as a connecting factor, which has been 
widely discarded in terms of determining the applicable law in the electronic commerce, 
 
“Cryptocurrencies and the Conflict of Laws”, in FOX, D. and GREEN, S. (eds.), Cryptocurrencies in Public 
and Private Law, Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. 105-106 (pp. 93-137). 
100 For instance, the Hague Convention on the law applicable to international sales of goods, of 15 June 
1955; the Convention on the contract for the international carriage of goods by road, of 19 May 1956 and 
the Convention concerning international carriage by rail, of 9 May 1980 (Protocol of Modification 3 June 
1999). 
101 Supra, paragraph III.2. 
102 GUILLAUME, F., “Blockchain: le pont du droit international privé entre l’espace numérique et l’espace 
physique”, supra, loc. cit., pp. 174-175; GUILLAUME, F., “Aspects of private international law related to 
blockchain transactions”, supra, loc. cit., p. 59; RÜHL, G., “Smart (legal) contracts, or: Which (contract) 
law for Smart contracts?”, supra, loc. cit., p. 6.  
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unless the contractual terms establish otherwise.103 Indeed, the criteria based on the 
location of the server or the Internet provider have been mostly rejected because of their 
arbitrariness and the fact that the location of those elements remain unknown to some of 
the contracting parties.104  
 
When it comes to blockchain-based smart contracts, these criteria should also be rejected 
in order to determine the applicable law for the same reason, but, by contrast, these criteria 
could be taken into consideration with a view to establishing the internationality of the 
relevant smart contract. Pursuant to the international location of the nodes’ criterion, 
business-to-business blockchain-based smart contracts could be considered to be 
international unless the terms and conditions of the blockchain network specify otherwise 
concerning the internationality of its network.  
 
However, the use of the criterion based on the nodes’ location in the context of 
permissioned blockchains by users whose identities are disclosed becomes more doubtful 
when the smart contract is concluded between parties established in the same country, 
unless other international criteria resulted from the case. By contrast, in other situations, 
the criterion of the nodes’ location could again gain relevance if, for instance, the nodes 
were holding accountable for any damages to the users. On the other hand, the use of 
permissioned blockchains by users (and nodes) connected to one single country does not 
necessarily mean that the smart contract cannot become international if the counterparties 
insert into their contractual agreement a choice of law clause in favor of a foreign law 
(Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation). In such circumstances, however, the chosen law 
will not displace the application of the mandatory rules in force in the country in which 
all the relevant elements of the situation were located at the time of the choice (Article 
3.3 of the Rome I Regulation).  
 
As for the determination of the applicable law, the Rome I Regulation gives precedence 
to party autonomy (Article 3). Nevertheless, if the contracting parties do not agree on the 
applicable law or the parties’ consent to this agreement is induced by vitiating factors, the 
objective connecting factors of Article 4 do therefore apply. 
 
b) General connecting factors 
 
b.1) Party autonomy (Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation) 
 
103 See, among others, DE MIGUEL ASENSIO, P. A., Derecho privado de internet, 5th ed., Civitas, 
Thomson Reuters, Madrid, 2015, p. 1061; VAN der HOF, S., “Party Autonomy and International Online 
Business-to-Business Contracts in Europe and the United States”, in SCHULTS, A. (ed.), Legal Aspects of 
an E-Commerce Transaction, International Conference in The Hague, 26 and 27 October 2004, Sellier, 
European Law Publishers, München, 2006, p. 128 (pp. 123-134); CALVO CARAVACA, A. L. and 
CARRASCOSA GONZÁLEZ, J., Derecho internacional privado, Vol. II, 17th ed., Comares, Granada, 
2017, p. 1169; FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, J. C. and SÁNCHEZ LORENZO, S., Derecho internacional 
privado, 11h ed., Civitas, Thomson Reuters, 2020, p. 667; RÜHL, G., “Smart (legal) contracts, or: Which 
(contract) law for Smart contracts?”, supra, loc. cit., p. 6 and p. 16. By contrast, other authors have turned 
to this criterion as a connecting factor to determine the law applicable to the relationships established in the 
framework of cryptocurrency networks. See on this aspect, DICKINSON, A., supra, loc. cit., pp. 112-114.  
104 VAN der HOF, S., supra, loc. cit., p. 128. 
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The Rome I Regulation gives priority to party autonomy. Thus, contracting parties are 
free to choose the law governing their contractual relationship. In terms of blockchain 
technology, the choice of the law applicable to the smart contract is in line with the self-
help nature attributable by some authors to these contracts, as sustained in the blockchain, 
in the sense that this choice of law clause may contribute to ensuring the execution of the 
contract105 insofar as the parties decide to locate the contract in a particular legal system 
that will govern every aspect of it (Article 12 of the Rome I Regulation). Moreover, the 
choice of the applicable law also ensures the choice of a legal system that recognizes 
blockchain-based smart contracts as a way of expressing binding legal agreements (as the 
law that governs contracts in substance in accordance with the conflict-of-law rules for 
formal validity under Article 11 of the Rome I Regulation).  
 
In spite of this choice of law agreement not being in line with the “If A / Then B” writing 
style, that is to say, the one run by the code and executable by the blockchain network, its 
non-executable nature does not demand that this clause may not be stored in the 
blockchain as part of the contractual agreement according to any of  the forms to which I 
referred some paragraphs above.106  
  
Article 3.1 of the Rome I Regulation also permits a tacit choice of the applicable law, as 
this provision states that “The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by 
the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case”. The tacit choice seeks to 
establish the real will of the contracting parties for the application of a certain law. 
Therefore, the parties must manifest a clear intention to make a choice of law.107 And this 
intention may stem either from the terms of the contract or from the circumstances of the 
case. In relation to the first option, this is to say, from the terms of the contract, a cursory 
reading of the tacit interpretation embraced by Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation does 
not align itself well with the computer coding writing style that seeks to be clear in order 
to eliminate ambiguity in its interpretation108, particularly, within the existing premature 
situation of having a blockchain-based smart contract which is only sustained in a 
computer code version. However, let us imagine a blockchain-based smart contract that 
used an oracle to get external information (such as, for instance, interest rates; price 
fluctuation or compensation limits for loss, etc.) to the blockchain for ensuring its self-
execution function. In the event of such information being associated to a given country, 
 
105 CARIA, R. de, supra, loc. cit., p. 31; RASKIN, M., supra, loc. cit., pp. 313-314; PONCIBÒ, C. and 
DiMATTEO, L. A., supra, loc. cit., p. 118. 
106 See, supra, paragraph III.3. In particular, as for the use of the Ricardian Contract to accommodate choice 
of law clauses, see RÜHL, G., “Smart (legal) contracts, or: Which (contract) law for Smart contracts?”, 
supra, loc. cit., p. 12 
107 Interpreting the analogous provision contained in Article 3 of the Rome Convention on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations, 10 June 1980, see GIULIANO, M. And LAGARDE, P., “Rapport on 
the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations”, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C 282, 31 October 1980, p. 17. 
108 In relation to the characteristics of computer language, see, among others, CANNARSA, M., “Contract 
Interpretation”, in DiMATTEO, L. A, CANNARSA, M. and PONCIBÒ, C. (eds.), The Cambridge 
Handbook of Smart Contracts, Blockchain Technology and Digital Platforms, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2020, pp. 106-107 (pp. 102-117). 
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the law of that country could be considered to govern the contract as an expression of a 
contracting parties’ tacit choice of the applicable law. 
 
On the other hand, as for the tacit choice of the applicable law derived from the 
circumstances of the case, here, the same off-line criteria that govern international 
contracts in general could also be used109 to ascertain the law governing blockchain-based 
smart contracts.  
 
b.2) The applicable law as a default rule (Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation) 
 
If the contracting parties do not choose the law governing their contractual relationship 
or if the chosen law is declared unenforceable because of the concurrence of vitiating 
factors, then Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation sets out a fallback rule. This rule 
envisages different scenarios. In the first place, Article 4.1 determines directly the law 
governing eight different categories of contractual obligations establishing a specific 
connecting factor for each of them. However, if the controversial contractual obligation 
does not fit within any of the categories of such contractual obligations or the elements 
of the contract fit into more than one of those categories, then the second connecting 
factor appoints the law of the country where the person required to make the characteristic 
performance of the contract has his or her habitual residence (Article 4.2). Nonetheless, 
courts may apply the law of another country if they find their case to be manifestly more 
closely connected with that of another country (Article 4.3). This same last connecting 
factor will be applied to those contracts that are not covered by the first two paragraphs 
of Article 4 (Article 4.4). 
 
The foregoing explanation of Article 4, as a default rule, embraces territorial connecting 
factors such as, for instance, the habitual residence of the seller or the person required to 
make the characteristic performance of the contract, the location of the property or the 
country with whom the contract presents its closest connections, which are not entirely 
appropriate to be applicable to permissionless blockchains, in particular. This assertion is 
particularly relevant in relation to the habitual residence-based connecting factor, 
fundamentally used by the first two paragraphs of Article 4, when the identity of the 
contracting parties to the blockchain-based smart contract is anonymous or pseudo-
anonymous, as is mostly the case in the context of permissionless blockchains. In this 
case, the contracting parties only disclose their respective digital addresses which are 
generated, in turn, by their respective private and public keys, thereby making it 
practically impossible to discover their real identity110 and, as a result, their habitual 
residences. This makes it virtually impossible to adjudicate the dispute. Indeed, this event 
gives rise to an initial problem of obtaining remedies and determining jurisdiction as has 
 
109 For the criteria used to infer a tacit choice of law from the parties’ will in the field of Internet contracts 
see DE MIGUEL ASENSIO, P. A., supra, op. cit., p. 1061.  
110 On this point see, supra, footnote 47. 
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been pointed out111 since obtaining such remedies is dependent upon being able to identify 
the parties112 involved in the controversy.  
 
In terms of conflict-of-law rules, as mentioned above, anonymity also makes it 
complicated to ascertain the location of the territorial connecting factors used by Article 
4 of the Rome I regulation. In this regard, however, the Rome I Regulation has already 
tackled contractual obligations in which at least one of the two contracting parties is 
unknown, at least, at the moment of formalizing the contract as Article 4.1 g) reflects 
when dealing with contracts for the sale of goods by auction. In relation to these kinds of 
contracts, the Rome I Regulation opts for submitting the contracts to “the law of the 
country where the auction takes place, if such a place can be determined”, rather than the 
law of the seller’s habitual residence as established in Article 4.1. a) for contracts of the 
sale of goods, in general. The reason for this lies in the fact that personal details may be 
unknown by the contracting parties, thereby justifying the application of a known 
connecting factor, that is to say, that of the place of auction, insofar as this place is known. 
However, this place cannot be identified if the auction takes place on the  Internet. Under 
such circumstances, the law applicable should be determined in accordance with the 
closest and most real connection contained in Article 4.4. Hence, the use of the closest 
connecting factor may be especially appropriate to govern contracts to be performed in 
cyberspace with connections with the real (off-line) world. 
 
Nonetheless, the inconvenience of using geographical connecting factors in the context 
of permissionless blockchains as represented by the closest connecting factor, as 
established by paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same Article 4, has been underlined. This 
connecting factor has been argued to be meaningless in permissionless blockchain 
scenarios which are completely de-nationalized113 because it is extremely difficult to 
individualize the country most closely connected with the controversial situation, when 
the elements operating the blockchain-based smart contract are disseminated all over the 
world without being tied to any particular country114, especially when those elements are 
primary associated to the nodes. Indeed, the assertion of refuting the viability of the 
closest connecting factor is tied to the widespread location of the nodes all over the world. 
However, if this criterion has been rejected to be used as an objective connecting factor 
to determine the applicable law within the framework of electronic commerce, then the 
same rejection could also be maintained in the field of blockchain-based smart contracts. 
The main reason for this lies in the difficulty of identifying the location of the nodes 
involved in a given smart contract, not to mention when this intervention is random, 
insofar as not all of the nodes of the network take part in the same transactions. 
 
 
111 For instance, among others, see PONCIBÒ, C. and DiMATTEO, L. A., supra, loc. cit., p. 123; 
MÖSLEIN, F., supra, loc. cit., p. 16; TJONG TJIN TAI, T., “Formalizing contract law for smart contracts”, 
Tilburg Private Law Working Papers Series, No. 06/2017, p. 3. 
112 CLÉMENT, M., “Smart Contracts and the Courts”, in DiMATTEO, L. A, CANNARSA, M. and 
PONCIBÒ, C. (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Smart Contracts, Blockchain Technology and Digital 
Platforms, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020, p. 286 (pp. 271-287). 
113 LEHMANN, M., supra, loc. cit., p. 112. 
114 LEHMANN, M., supra, loc. cit., p. 112; GUILLAUME, F., “Aspects of private international law related 
to blockchain transactions”, supra, loc. cit., p. 61 and p. 79. 
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IV. FINAL REMARKS 
 
The ongoing implementation of blockchain-based smart contracts is fundamentally based 
on the trust placed on the digital code run by either a pseudo-anonymous or identified 
community that ensures the correct performance of cross-border trade operations in the 
network ignoring the intervention of third parties. Insofar as this system works as planned, 
private law is not required. Nevertheless, coding is still a human activity exposed to errors 
and misconduct. In addition, the development of smart contracts at the present time is still 
in its infancy as has been shown, firstly, due to the impossibility of smart contracts of 
being able to execute every single clause of a contractual agreement as a result of some 
clauses being unable to be expressed in the conditional code language “If A/ Then B”, as 
was explained above. And secondly, the additional fact that smart contracts cannot yet 
execute off-line obligations, such as  the delivery of physical things in the context of 
contracts of carriage or for the sale of goods, unless some type of interconnection exists 
between the off-line obligation and the software running the smart contract, which the 
Internet of Things (IoT) tends to create between the two of them.  
   
In terms of conflict-of-law rules, the Rome I Regulation has proven itself to be resilient 
enough to accommodate business-to-business blockchain-based smart contracts due to 
the fact that they still have relevant and significant connections with the real (off-line) 
world. 
 
What remains to be seen is how the development of artificial intelligence and robotization 
will affect the implementation and performance of smart contracts and what the legal 
implications will be. 
 
 
